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COMMENTARIES
SHOULD ETHICAL AND LEGAL STANDARDS
FOR PHYSICIANS BE CHANGED TO ACCOMMODATE
NEW MODELS FOR RATIONING HEALTH CARE?
EDWARD B. HIRSHFELDt
INTRODUCTION
This Commentary provides a physician-oriented perspective on
rationing health care.1 It frames the rationing issues that are facing
physicians and suggests ways in which they should be handled.
Americans expect that all people should have access to health
care when it is necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness
or injury.2 This ideal is based on our perception that health care
can be essential to the maintenance of life itself, and may also be
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I For purposes of this Commentary, rationing is defined as making a choice
among the claims of individuals who are competing for scarce resources. This broad
definition includes implicit rationing, which occurs in distribution methods that do
not involve a declared intent to ration pursuant to a predetermined plan, but which
may result in denials of goods or services to some individuals. See generally David M.
Eddy, Rationing by Patient Choice, 265JAMA 105, 106 (1991) (presenting an analysis
of implicit rationing, which is referred to as "patient-choice rationing," and
comparisons to other methods of rationing, such as "top-down" and "meat-ax"
rationing); David C. Hadorn & Robert H. Brook, The Health Care Resource Allocation
Debate: Defining our Terms, 266 JAMA 3328, 3331 (1991) (defining rationing as the
"societal toleration of inequitable access ... to services deemed necessary, as defined
by reference to appropriate clinical guidelines"). The definition also includes explicit
rationing, where individual rationing decisions are deliberately and systematically
made pursuant to a predetermined set of criteria. An example of explicit rationing
is the evaluations done by committees that review candidates for transplant surgery
when the supply of available organs falls short of demand. The candidates are
evaluated pursuant to predetermined criteria to decide who should receive the organ
transplant. Cf., e.g., Basil A. Stoll, Choosing Between Cancer Patients, 16J. MED. ETHICS
71 (1990) (discussing the selection of patients for cancer treatment using criteria/
guidelines); see also P.A. Lewis & M. Charney, Which of Two Individuals Do You Treat
When Only TheirAges Are Different and You Can't Treat Both?, 15J. MED. ETHICS 28,29-
32 (1989) (analyzing the Cardiff Health Survey which utilized public opinion surveys
to determine criteria for medical treatment).
2 See DAVID MECHANIC, FUTURE ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 38-47 (1979).
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essential for the enjoyment of life free from disability. Health
policy in the United States has long been oriented towards assuring
that all Americans have access to needed health care, and enormous
progress has been made during the past fifty years to achieve that
goal.3 It has not, however, been attained. Implicit, market-based
rationing4 has always existed in the United States and continues to
affect a substantial number of Americans. While about 85% of the
population is covered by a health plan that finances needed health
3 For at least the past fifty years, the dominant theme in public policy for health
care has been to eliminate rationing. That theme has resulted in legislation to
facilitate the creation of not-for-profit, privately organized health plans, such as those
sponsored by the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Associations, see ROBERT D. ETLERS,
REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 104-09 (1963), the development
of federal and state programs to finance hospital construction, see Hospital Survey &
Construction Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (current version
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 291o-1 (1988)), the funding for education of health care
professionals, see Comprehensive Health Manpower Training Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-157, 85 Stat. 431 (1971) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 292a to 295g-ll
(1988)), and the passage of the federal Medicare programs to cover elderly and
disabled individuals and the federal and state Medicaid program to cover the
impoverished, see The Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79
Stat. 286 (Medicare provisions codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395ccc;
Medicaid provisions codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988 & Supp.
11989)).
We subsidize the individual by creating pools of funds that can be accessed when
health care is needed. These pools, which we call health insurance or health plans,
are privately organized by employers, associations, and other interest groups, and by
health insurers for individuals not affiliated with one of these groups. See CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SELECTED OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING HEALTH INSURANCE
COvERAGE-#2, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter SELECTED OPTIONS].
These pools insulate most individuals from being deprived of health care due to
a lack of resources to compete for services in a true market. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS: CAUSES, IMPLICATIONS, AND
STRATEGIES 26 (1991) [hereinafter RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS]. Beneficiaries of a
pool generally may consume as many services as are deemed medically necessary
within the limits of coverage provided by the pool. Standardized health insurance
policies, as well as Medicare coverage, provide reimbursement for medical treatment
and services that are "reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an
illness or injury," provided that the services or products used are "safe and effective"
and not merely "experimental." 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (1988).
4 A market is a form of implicit rationing. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM
D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 69 (12th ed. 1985). All individuals are equally eligible to
purchase any medical service in a market for health care, and there is no intent to
deny services to any individual. Purchasers unwilling or unable to pay market prices
for goods do not obtain them, however. Queuing is another form of implicit ration-
ing. See HENRY A. SHENKIN, CLINICAL PRACTICE AND COST CONTAINMENT 58-62
(1986); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Rationing the Nation's Health-Care Surplus: An American
Paradox, THE INTERNIST, Feb. 1986, at 11, 11. Anyone may enter a queue for health
care services, but care may be delayed until it is too late to be beneficial.
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care, there are thirty-four to forty million individuals who are not
covered by a health plan.5 In addition, of those Americans who are
covered by a health plan, it is estimated that twenty million are
underinsured, meaning that they do not have adequate coverage.
6
5 A substantial number of people, recently estimated at 33,400,000, are not
covered by a pool. See RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 3, at 67. An
additional large share of the population, which one estimate places at 20,000,000, see
LEWIN/ICF, HEALTH & SCIENCES INT'L, THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING SYSTEM AND
THE UNINSURED 26 (1989) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE FINANCING SYSTEM], is underin-
sured, meaning that they have some coverage from a pool but still bear a material risk
of paying substantial amounts for health care services.
Many uninsured persons do not qualify for entry into a privately organized pool
or a government program and cannot afford to purchase their own health plan.
These people are at risk of not being able to obtain needed health care due to
implicit rationing, and they do not have the means to avoid the risk. They include,
for example, low-income individuals (and their dependents) whose employers do not
provide a health plan, but who are not sufficiently impoverished or old enough to
qualify for a government plan. See id. at xi; see also SELECTED OPTIONS, supra note 3,
at 12 (analyzing why individuals are uninsured); HEALTH CARE FINANCING SYSTEM,
supra, at 7 (discussing characteristics of uninsured populations); Emily Friedman, The
Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA 2491, 2491-92 (1991) (same). Also
included are the unemployed and their dependents who, although impoverished, do
not meet various eligibility requirements of a government program. An increasing
number of uninsured would ordinarily be covered by an employer sponsored health
plan, but are not accepted because they have substantial medical problems, which
presents a larger potential liability than the employer or its insurer wants to accept.
See Long-Term Strategies for Health Care: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991) (statement of Robert D. Reishauer, Director,
Congressional Budget Office); RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 3, at 70-71.
There are uninsured who apparently have access to a plan, but do not
participate. The reasons why are not well understood. Some have access to an
employer-sponsored health plan, but refuse it because the employer requires
participants to pay part of the cost of the plan. These people may be unable or
unwilling to bear the cost sharing. In addition, there is a substantial number of
uninsured people who do not qualify for an employer-sponsored plan, but appear to
have enough income to purchase their own health plan. Finally, a substantial group
of uninsured are eligible for the federal and state sponsored Medicaid program but
do not enroll, perhaps because of lack of information or sophistication. See HEALTH
CARE FINANCING SYSTEM, supra, at 107-09. While some of the uninsured may choose
to bear the risk of no coverage, most do not have a choice. For an illustration and
debate of the equality of access to health care, see Amy Gutmann, For and Against
Equal Access to Health Care, in IN SEARCH OF EQUITY. HEALTH NEEDS AND THE
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 43 (Ronald Bayer et al. eds., 1983).
' The underinsured are individuals who are included in a health plan, but who
might not be able to obtain needed care under the terms of the plan. Some plans,
especially government plans, are underfunded and do not pay providers enough to
allow their beneficiaries to compete for services with the beneficiaries of better-
funded plans. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 70-71. Other
underinsured individuals have health problems that are not covered by their plans.
See id. at 24. Still others may have consumed so much health care that they have
exhausted the financial limits of the terms of coverage under the plan. And some
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During recent years, our progress towards attaining the ideal of
100% access to needed health care has been threatened by rapidly
increasing expenditures on health care.7  The increases are
straining the ability of payers to maintain existing levels of coverage
and are hampering the effort to expand coverage for the unin-
sured.8 As a result, there is great concern that the United States
may need care which is excluded from the plan, such as medical services considered
to be experimental.
7 The expenditure problem is well documented. The total amount spent on
health care in the United States increased from $249 billion in 1980 to $604 billion
in 1989. See PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, MEDICARE AND THE
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 11 (1991) [hereinafter PAYMENT ASSESSMENT
COMM'N]. After adjusting for inflation, the real annual rate of growth in total health
care spending from 1980 to 1989 was 5.4%. See id. In terms of 1989 dollars, real
health care spending per capita rose from $950 in 1970 to $2354 in 1989, an average
annual growth rate of about 4.9%. See RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS, supra note 3, at
2. By comparison, real rates of growth for other sectors of the economy during the
same years (1970-1988) were much smaller. Spending for food increased at an
average annual rate of about 1%, and spending for housing increased at an average
annual rate of 3%. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN HEALTH
EXPENDITURES BY MEDICARE AND THE NATION 5 (1991) [hereinafter TRENDS IN
HEALTH EXPENDITURES].
As a result of its growth rate, health care spending accounts for an increasing
share of the gross national product (GNP). The percentage of GNP attributed to
health care increased from 9.1% in 1980 to 11.6% in 1989. See Katharine R. Levit et
al., National Health Care Spending 1989, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1991, at 117, 119
exhibit 2. Government officials estimate that if current growth rates in health care
spending continue, health care will account for 15% to 16% of GNP by the year 2000.
See TRENDS IN HEALTH EXPENDITURES, supra, at 8; Sally T. Sonnefeld et al., Projections
of National Health Expenditures Through the Year 2000, 13 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1,
1 (1991). Although the service sector, which includes health care services, expanded
as a percentage of GNP throughout the 1980s, health care services increased at twice
the rate of all other services. See PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, supra, at 12.
8 The increasing expenditure on health care services during recent years threatens
to outstrip the ability of health plans to pay for care needed by their beneficiaries.
The cost of maintaining private plans is rising. See Tim Healy, High Stakes-For the Self-
Insured-Health Costs Push Small Employers to Seek Alternatives, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 4,
1991, at B1; PaulJ. Kenkel, Indemnity Plans Rate Higher in WorkerSatisfaction, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 17, 1992, at 44, 44; David Zinman, The National Insurance
Campaign, NEWSDAY, June 5, 1990, at 5. And tax revenues are not increasing fast
enough to replenish the government plans. See Sonnefeld et al., supra note 7, at 1.
Due to the measures taken by private and government plans to control costs, more
people are losing some or all of their health care coverage.
Employers are starting to demand that employees contribute more towards the
cost of health plans, which causes more employees to terminate their coverage
because they feel they cannot afford to participate. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING
SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 98; see also Healy, supra, at B1 (discussing problems faced by
employees of employer self-funded insurance plans); William Raspberry, Health Care
For Eveiyone, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1990, at A23 (commenting on the high degree of
employee concern over the increased cost of health care). The employees who do
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will lose many of the gains already made as a result of efforts to
attain the ideal, unless solutions to the cost problem are found and
implemented.9 The reasons for the cost problem are numerous,
but they can be organized into two categories: (1) inefficiencies in
the finance and delivery of health care, and (2) fundamental factors
that could not be altered by eliminating inefficiencies. Two types
of solutions have been proposed to resolve the problem of increas-
ing costs-one optimistic and the other pessimistic.
participate are aware of the greater risk of incurring medical expenses, as cost sharing
mechanisms such as co-payments and deductibles increase. See HEALTH CARE
FINANCING SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 98. Some employers are reducing the scope of
coverage; they have dropped coverage for prescription drugs and limited the extent
of coverage for expensive services such as mental health care. See Mark Merenda,
Business and Abuse: The Mental Health Mess, FLA. BUs.-SouTHWEsT, Oct. 1990, at 14,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FBS File.
Employers are also reducing coverage limits, which increases the likelihood that
an employee will run out of coverage in the event of a catastrophic health problem.
See generally HEALTH CARE FINANCING SYSTEM, supra note 5, at 32 (analyzing the
consequences of underinsurance). Eligibility requirements for employer plans are
becoming more restrictive. New employees increasingly are not being accepted into
employer plans because of past health care problems, or they are being accepted
subject to the exclusion of coverage for preexisting health problems. See id. at 95.
Finally, many small employers are dropping or not establishing health plans for their
employees because they cannot afford the cost. See id. at 89.
' Numerous health care system reform proposals have been advanced in recent
years for the purpose of eliminating implicit rationing. See generally Symposium,
Caring For the Uninsured and Underinsured, 265 JAMA 2491 (1991) (presenting
numerous health care reform proposals concerning Medicaid, health care access,
employer insurance, and Medicare). The proposals have been advanced by
academicians, think tanks, health care industry trade associations, general business
trade associations, politicians, and others. Many of them have been converted into
legislative bills that are pending in Congress and state legislatures. See Laura E.
Noble, Healthcare Reform Stews in Congressional Pressure Cooker, HEALTHCARE FIN.
MGMT., Jan. 1992, at 21, 28-36 (presenting an overview of three categories of
healthcare reform bills: incremental approaches, employer-based programs, and
single-payer programs). Several congressional bills aimed at reducing and eliminating
inefficiencies of the health care system in order to control costs have recently been
introduced. See AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, HEALTH REFORM PROPOSALS OF THE 102ND
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES (1992) [hereinafter HEALTH REFORM
PROPOSALS] (providing analysis of numerous health care bills introduced in Congress);
see also THE PRESIDENT'S COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH REFORM PROGRAM 31 (Presidential
White Paper, released Feb. 6, 1992) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM]; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CANADIAN HEALTH INSURANCE: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 28-71 (1991) [hereinafter CANADIAN HEALTH] (discussing Canadian single-
payer system and its applicability to the United States). For an overview of current
state legislation, see Roger Thompson, States Take Lead in Health Reform, NATION'S
Bus., Apr. 1992, at 18. There is enough momentum behind the reform movement
that it is widely expected that federal health reform legislation will be passed by
Congress or by a number of states in the near future.
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The optimistic solution is to rein in costs and bring the
economics of the health care system into balance by eliminating
inefficiencies.10 A variety of health system dysfunctions would be
targeted by these efforts, and numerous methods have been
proposed to correct them, ranging from comprehensive government
regulation to the introduction of controlled-market forces. A
procedure that would be used by all the different proposals and that
may be essential to the success of any is the development of criteria
and techniques to distinguish needed care from unnecessary
services. It is believed that one of the dysfunctions in our current
system is the provision of substantial amounts of care that is not
needed."
The pessimistic solution assumes that elimination of inefficien-
cies will not solve the cost problem because fundamental factors-an
aging population, advances in technology, and structural inflation-
will continue to increase costs more rapidly than the underlying rate
of inflation for the economy as a whole. 12 Pessimists argue that
rationing is the inevitable solution to cost increases, and they
advocate that new models of rationing be developed. Some propose
explicit rationing schemes under which health care would be
allocated pursuant to equitable principles arrived at through an
open and democratic process.' 3 Others advocate more sophisticat-
'o See Alain C. Enthoven, Shattuck Lecture-Cutting Costs Without Cutting the Quality
of Care, 298 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1229 (1978); see also Robert H. Brook & Kathleen N.
Lohr, Will We Need To Ration Effective Health Care?, IsSUES Sci. & TECH., Fall 1986, at
68, 68 (estimating that one-third of the nation's health care dollars go to unnecessary
medical services and urging elimination of this problem by significantly altering the
traditional concept of medical practice).
" See William B. Schwartz, The Inevitable Failure of Current Cost-Containment
Strategies: Why They Can Provide Only Temporary Relief, 257JAMA 220 (1987); Brook
& Lohr, supra note 10, at 72-73; see also John T. Kelly & Shirley E. Kellie, Appropriate.
ness of Medical Care: Findings, Strategies, 114 ARCHIVES PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY
MED. 1119, 1119-20 (1990) (summarizing current literature concerning inappropriate
medical services that questions whether a significant proportion (up to 20%) of
medical care is actually unnecessary, even though only 2% of claims reviewed by
Medicare Peer Review Organizations were found unnecessary); Lucian L. Leape,
Practice Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 42 (1990)
(analyzing the use of practice guidelines as a tool to reduce inappropriate care and
to help control costs); William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness In Health Care: An
Initiative to Evaluate and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1197, 1200
(1988) (reviewing patient outcome studies and the link to practice patterns).
12 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 221.
1 See, e.g., JOHN F. KILNER, ETHICAL CRITERIA IN PATIENT SELECTION: WHO
LIVES? WHO DIES? (1990) (describing social, sociomedical, medical, and personal
criteria that may be used in ethical rationing); Jennifer Dixon & H. Gilbert Welch,
Priority Setting: Lessons from Oregon, 337 LANCET 891 (1991) (describing Oregon's
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ed versions of our existing system of implicit rationing.
14
Some scholars have suggested that the standard of care in
medical malpractice litigation be altered to accommodate explicit
rationing or new forms of implicit rationing. 15 The political
reality, however, is that Americans generally do not want a compre-
hensive explicit rationing scheme or new forms of implicit ration-
ing-they want access to needed health care. Therefore, the
optimistic solution has been embraced by politicians and policy
rationing plan); David M. Eddy, What's Going on in Oregon?, 266 JAMA 417 (1991)
(analyzing the impact of the Oregon rationing plan); cf. WARREN GREENBERG,
COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND RATIONING IN HEALTH CARE 139-49 (1991)
(analyzing the effects of technology on rationing).
14 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Information, and the
Contractual Foundation for Medical Services, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at
201 (exploring influences on the expansion of medical malpractice liability and
changes in the delivery of health care services); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice
Guidelines For Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 792 (1990)
(discussing conceptual models for practice guidelines and policy purposes, and
advocating that practice guidelines with different treatment approaches be available
as the basis for health plan contracts); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciamy Contracting:
Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PreT. L.
REv. 365 (1990) (examining assumptions related to the use of patient-provider
contracting); Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks
Between Patients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173
(analyzing the role of custom in the treatment of medical malpractice cases and the
disadvantages of patient-provider contracting).
"s See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard under Health Care Cost
Containment, 17 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 347 (1989) (examining the views of
commentators, particularly E. Haavi Morreim, on this issue). For commentators who,
to accommodate rationing, advocate changing the standard of care for assessing
malpractice claims, see Robert C. Macaulay, Jr., Health Care Cost Containment and
Medical Malpractice: On a Collision Course, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 91, 103-07 (1986);
E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medicare Care, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1719 (1987) [hereinafter Morreim, Cost Containment]; E. Haavi Morreim, Stratified
Scarcity: Redefining the Standard of Care, 17 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE 356 (1989)
[hereinafter Morreim, Scarcity]; Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of
Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1004, 1017-19 (1985); see also Jean Lairson,
Reexamining the Physician's Duty of Care in Response to Medicare's Prospective Payment
System, 62 WASH. L. REv. 791, 804 (1987) (arguing against modifying the standard of
care to accommodate economic considerations); Diana Vance-Bryan, Note, Medicare's
Prospective Payment System: Can Quality Care Survive?, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1417 (1984)
(arguing that malpractice laws will not be sufficient to protect patients from poor
quality caused by consideration of economic factors). For commentators analyzing
whether economic considerations will evolve into the standard of care as it is
developed by the courts, see James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A
Constitutiona4 Lega4 and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1345 (1981); Rand E.
Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. REV.
1401 (1981); Peter H. Schuck, Malpractice Liability and the Rationing of Care, 59 TEX.
L. REV. 1421 (1981).
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makers and efforts are being made to implement it.16 As a result,
the problem that deserves our attention is not how to accommodate
new forms of rationing; rather, it is how to define necessary as
opposed to unneeded care.
17
Under our current system, physicians and other providers make
decisions about necessity in consultation with their patients, payers
second guess those decisions, and courts may review the perfor-
mance of providers and payers in malpractice or other tort
litigation. Neither medicine nor law has a usable or reliable
methodology or set of principles in place to distinguish between
needed and unnecessary care, although one major theme followed
is that the best interests of the patient should be the overriding
concern when determining what care should be provided. 8
16 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
17 The existing standard of care is actually compatible with existing forms of
implicit rationing and would be compatible with explicit rationing. See infra parts
IV.B & V.
18 The current legal standard of care for physicians is patient-interest oriented.
It requires a physician to exercise the skill and care that a competent physician would
apply in similar circumstances. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTs]. In the
process of exercising due care, the physician is to place the interests of the patient
above all other considerations. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other
Healers §§ 166-168 (1981) [hereinafter PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, AND OTHERS]. Ethical
standards for physicians are similar. The AMA's Code of Medical Ethics states that a
"physician has a duty to do all that he or she can for the benefit of the individual
patient." COUNCIL ON ETHICAL ANDJUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS 3 op. 2.03 (1992) [hereinafter CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS]; see also
id. at 20 op. 4.04 (stating that 'where the economic interests of the hospital are in
conflict with patient welfare, patient welfare takes priority"); id. at 7 op. 2.09
("[S]ocial policy expects that concern for the care the patient receives will be the
physician's first consideration.").
Very similar patient-interest oriented standards of care apply to other health care
professionals and to hospitals. Virtually all health care professionals are held to a
standard of care that requires them to exercise the degree of skill and care that is
applied by a competent individual of the same profession when treating patients. See
PROSSER ON TORTS, supra, § 32, at 185. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior
hospitals are liable for the patient care provided by their employees, which usually
include a wide variety of health care professionals. See generally Diane M. Janulis &
Alan D. Hornstein, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Hospitals' Liability for
Physicians' Malpractice, 64 NEB. L. REV. 689 (1985) (presenting problems faced by
hospitals held liable for physician's acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior).
Under some conditions, hospitals are liable for professionals who have privileges to
provide care at the hospital, but who are not employees, under theories of apparent
or ostensible agency. See id. at 696-702; see also Claire G. Combs, Hospital Vicarious
Liability for the Negligence of Independent Contractors and Staff Physicians: Criticisms of
Ostensible Agency Doctrine in Ohio, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 711 (1987) (providing analysis
of the theory of ostensible agency, corporate negligence, and the doctrine of
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Decisions about necessity, however, are based on case by case
respondent superior). When a hospital is responsible for the patient care of health
care professionals under these theories of vicarious liability, the standard of care
applicable to the health care professional is also applied to the hospital. SeeJanulis
& Hornstein, supra, at 704-08.
A growing body of law is beginning to apply theories of vicarious liability to
payers, especially to HMOs and PPOs that limit a patient's choice of providers to
those who have contracted to provide care to their beneficiaries. Like hospitals, these
payers are held to the standard of care applicable to the provider involved under
theories of vicarious liability. See Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767NM (Cir. Ct. Saginaw
County, Mich. Apr. 27, 1986); Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., No. WD 39809,1989
Mo. App. LEXIS 577 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1989), overruled on other grounds by 781
S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989) (en banc); DeGenova v. Ansel, 555 A.2d 147 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); see
also Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding HMO vicariously liable for negligence of consulting physician); Sloan v.
Metropolitan Health Council, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1108-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that HMOs can be liable for physician/employee conduct under the doctrine
of respondeat superior); Williams v. Good Health Plus, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373, 374-77
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding HMO not liable for physicians found to be independent
contractors); Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and
Customay Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375 (presenting problems and solutions
surrounding the application of malpractice law to HMOs); William J. Curran &
George B. Moseley, III, The Malpractice Experience of Health Maintenance Organizations,
70 Nw. U. L. REV. 69 (1975) (examining HMO malpractice claim activity); Mark S.
Joffe, Potential HMO and Physician Liability Arising From Physician Incentive Arrange-
ments, HEALTHSPAN, Dec. 1988, at 9 (discussing HMOs' use of physician incentives
aimed at reducing unnecessary care in relation to their potential liability). In
addition, there are cases that appear to extend liability to payers that make decisions
about whether to pay for care recommended by physicians before the services are
provided, a process known as prospective or concurrent utilization review. Since the
grounds for refusing coverage may be lack of medical necessity for the services, and
since the services are generally not provided when coverage is denied, payers may be
liable for coverage denials based on erroneous conclusions that the services are not
necessary. The standard of care applicable to utilization review decisions of payers
appears to be similar to the standard of care applicable to the health care profes-
sionals who recommend the care for which coverage is requested. See Wilson v. Blue
Cross, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr.
810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); see also SondraJ. Byrnes, Corporation's Institution of Health
Care Review: LegalRisks, 33 MED. TRIALTECH. Q. 478,480 (1987) (discussing the legal
implications of utilization review programs); William A. Helvestine, LegalImplications
of Utilization Review, in CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE
ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 169 app. A (1989) (reviewing existing legal
guidelines surrounding utilization review decisions); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Redefining
Administrative Liability, 12 HEALTH MGMT. Q. 9 (1990) (commenting on the
emergence and growth of "administrative malpractice"); Ronald P. Smith, Insurance
Carrier Liability as a Result of Pre-Admission Screening and Hospital Stay Guidelines, 12
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189 (1985) (analyzing malpractice liability of insurance carriers
requiring utilization reviews); Kevin R. Jespersen & George H. Kendall, Utilization
Review: AvoidingLiability While Controlling Costs, HEALTHSPAN,July 1987, at 3 (1987)
(discussing the sources and theories of liability related to utilization reviews and
presenting steps to avoid such liability).
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determinations aided by the judgments of medical professionals as
opposed to the application of a set of predetermined criteria.
1 9
Currently, physicians and others are attempting to develop
criteria for the identification of unnecessary care.20 The issue is
important because where the boundary is set defines the difference
between the withholding of unneeded care and the failure to
provide or recommend needed services (i.e. malpractice). Ultimate-
ly, the boundary defines the difference between rationing and
withholding of unnecessary care. One of the primary issues
involved in defining necessary care is the extent to which the
societal interest in conserving costs should be taken into account.
While economic considerations have not been totally excluded by
physicians and courts in decisions about what care should be
provided to a patient, such considerations have not played a major
role. In deliberations about the extent to which the societal interest
should be taken into account, it may be possible to redefine-as the
provision of unnecessary care-the withholding of certain types of
care that providers and courts would now consider to be rationing.
Physicians will play an important role in the process of defining
what constitutes unnecessary care. They will provide the medical
information necessary to form opinions about whether care should
be provided in certain situations, and they will also develop and
advocate their own opinions about necessity. This Commentary
argues that physicians should adhere to traditional patient-interest
oriented ethical and legal standards when developing medical
information and forming opinions about necessity. Other societal
institutions, including legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts,
may choose to override physician opinions about necessity and give
greater weight to the societal interest in conserving costs. Given
19 See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 18, at 3 op. 2.03.
20 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Some commentators point out that
physician organizations and others have been developing guidelines for many years,
but they also recognize that the scale and scope of current efforts is new and
unprecedented. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRACTICE GUIDELINES: THE
EXPERIENCE OF MEDICAL SPECIALTY SOCIETIES 1 (1991); Anne-Marie Audet et al.,
Medical Practice Guidelines: Current Activities and Future Directions. 113 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 709 (1990); Mark R. Chassin, Standards of Care in Medicine, 25
INQUIRY 437, 437-38 (1988); John T. Kelly & James E. Swartwout, Development of
Practice Parameters by Physician Organizations, 16 QUALITY REV. BULL. 54 (1990);
Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder, Medical Standard Setting in the Current
Malpractice Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1989);
Steven H. Woolf, Practice Guidelines: A New Reality in Medicine, 150 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1811 (1990).
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that these institutions have the ability to do so, and given that they
are ultimately accountable to the populace in a representative
democracy, it is appropriately their role to make such decisions and
there is no reason for physicians to abandon their traditional role
as the patient's advocate. If that role is abandoned, we lose
something of incalculable value.
I. CAUSES OF RISING COSTS
The debate over how to control costs is crucial to the issue of
whether rationing can be eliminated. There are two basic reasons
for cost increases: rising prices for health care services and
increases in the volume and intensity of services. 2 1 The problems
are interrelated in cause and effect. It is not enough to bring one
problem under control without the other. Increases in prices can
offset savings achieved by reducing volume, and volume increases
can obliterate savings achieved by reducing prices. Of these two
problems, however, the more difficult one is controlling volume and
intensity. Prices can be limited by government price control
regulations or the introduction of market forces. The Gordian knot
is whether volume can be controlled without denying people needed
care.
As was mentioned earlier, many observers believe that it is
possible to bring volume and intensity under control without
denying anyone needed health care; others disagree.22 To under-
stand the differences in these perspectives, it is necessary to
examine the perceived causes of health care cost increases. There
appear to be multiple causes, but the extent to which each cause
contributes to cost increases is not known. Some of the problems
are external to the health care system, which means that the
problems cannot be eliminated by altering health policy. Other
problems exist within the health care system and therefore can be
more easily resolved. The major factors thought to contribute to
increases in volume and intensity are discussed below.
21 See Henry Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice
Before Us, 247 SCIENCE 418, 418 (1990); Eddy, supra note 1, at 105.
22 Seesupra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. Compare Enthoven,supra note 10,
at 1229-30, 1234-37 (arguing that a system where consumers and providers participate
in resource controlled plans will result in a decrease in costs) with Schwartz, supra
note 11, at 220-24 (arguing that reducing unnecessary care decreases expenditures,
but has little or no real impact on rising costs).
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A. Factors Internal to the Health Care System
23
1. Health Insurance and Government Health Plans
Perhaps the most significant contributor to increased health care
expenditures is the spread of private health insurance programs and
the creation of Medicare, Medicaid, and other government health
plans. Employer sponsored health insurance and subsidized
government plans insulate patients from the price of health care.
24
Historically, the existence of health insurance and government plans
also insulated providers from their own costs. Insurers and health
plans generally paid for medical care on the basis of "usual,
customary, and reasonable" fees and charges. 25 Some insurers
simply paid the usual and customary fees or charges of providers,
23 In addition to the factors discussed in this Section, two other major inefficien-
cies that inflate prices are increased regulation and administrative costs. Massive
increases of government regulation of the health care industry cont-ibute to rising
costs. For example, in 1992 alone, the implementation of just three regulatory
schemes will increase physician's costs by hundreds of millions of dollars. These new
schemes are: (1) regulations designed to protect health care workers from blood-
borne pathogens, see Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg.
64,004 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030), (2) regulations designed to
assure the quality of laboratories maintained in physician offices, promulgated under
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102
Stat. 2903 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 263a (1988)), and (3) regulations designed to make
physician offices more accessible to disabled patients, promulgated under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West Pamphlet 1992)). OSHA estimates that
compliance with the blood-borne pathogens regulations will cost physicians a
minimum of $144 million annually. See Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne
Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,039.
The administrative costs of the health care system are estimated to consume 20%
of total expenditures. Part of this is attributable to government regulations, the rest
is attributable to the existence of numerous payers. Providers have to keep track of
the claims, procedures, and criteria of numerous different entities. It is believed that
administrative costs would be much lower if providers had only one set of claims
procedures and criteria to comply with. See CANADIAN HEALTH, supra note 9, 28-33,
40-42.
24 See Aaron & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 418; Mark V. Pauly, Taxation, Health
Insurance, and Market Failure in the Medical Economy, 24J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 647
(1986). From 1950 to 1970, the proportion of hospital expenses paid out of pocket
by patients decreased from 30% to 9%. See HENRYJ. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE
CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE 39 (1991) [hereinafter SERIOUS AND
UNSTABLE]. As of 1987, patients' share of each dollar devoted to health care was
about 10 cents, and their share of each dollar paid to physicians was about 26 cents.
See Aaron & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 418.
25 42 U.S.C. § 13951(1988 & Supp. 11989); see also 5 BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING
I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE app. III, at T-48 to T-50 (1991)
(describing some typical exclusions to coverage).
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while others based their payments on the average amounts claimed
for specific services by the providers in a community.
26
Insulation from costs encourages patients to select providers on
the basis of perceived quality and to disregard differences in fees or
charges among providers.2 7  This propensity of patients causes
providers to compete by attempting to offer better quality, which
often means investing heavily in new medical technology.
28
Protection from costs also encourages patients to consume more
care than they would without insurance or health plan coverage.
29
It also allows providers to select patient management strategies
without regard to costs, as there is little or no risk that the care
provided will not be paid for. That encourages physicians to
recommend any care that might help a patient, especially if the
patient is seriously ill, even if it is not certain that the care will be
beneficial. The absence of cost pressures also allows providers to
plan a course of treatment without regard to the efficiency with
which services are provided and without regard to the comparative
costs of alternative therapies.
2. The Provision of Unnecessary Care
A second major factor alleged to contribute to increasing health
care expenditures is the provision of substantial amounts of
unnecessary health care due to a lack of knowledge about the
circumstances under which various kinds of medical services and
products are effective. Some researchers have estimated that 20%
to 30% of all health care services provided to patients are not
necessary.3 0  The problem proceeds from the availability of
26 See e.g., EILERS, supra note 3, at 178-209; Regina L. Herzlinger, How Companies
Tackle Health Care Costs: Part II, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 108, 115-17.
27 See MONICA NOETHER, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITION AMONG
HOsPITALs 7 (1987); see also DEAN E. FARLEY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
COMPETITION AMONG HOSPITALS: MARKET STRUCTURE AND ITS RELATION TO
UTILIZATION, COSTS AND FINANCIAL POSITION 4-6 (1985) (discussing the market
considerations related to physician and hospital competition); Carl J. Schramm &
Steven C. Renn, Hospital Mergers, Market Concentration and the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index, 33 EMORY L.J. 869, 883-84 (1984) (noting the role of the physician as the
"purchaser" of services because of the patients lack of sophistication).
28 Providers have little incentive to compete by offering lower prices because
doing so does not attract patients. Therefore, providers have little incentive to
reduce costs by becoming more efficient. The net result of increased demand,
decreased price responsiveness, incentives to invest in technology, and the lack of
incentives to realize efficiencies is higher prices. See supra note 27.
2 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
50 See, e.g., Kelly & Kellie, supra note 11, at 1119-20. Researchers have discovered
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insurance and government health plans. When a patient and
physician are in doubt as to whether care will benefit a patient, the
service is usually provided because there is little risk of nonpayment.
There is also no incentive to examine medical care closely to better
determine the circumstances under which it benefits a patient.
3. Professional Liability
Costs associated with professional liability also increase health
care expenditures. These costs include malpractice premiums and
a phenomenon known as "defensive medicine" (where physicians
provide medical care to guard against malpractice liability even
though the benefits of the care are uncertain).,1 Malpractice
premiums for physicians have increased at an annual rate of 15.1%
during recent years, totaling $5.6 billion in 1989.2 The estimated
cost of defensive medicine was $15.1 billion in 1989. 33 Together,
malpractice premiums and defensive medicine totaled about $20.7
billion in 1989, or about 18% of all expenditures on physician
that there are wide variations in the rates at which certain medical services are
provided to similar populations in different geographic areas with no discernible
differences in outcomes. See Leape, supra note 11, at 42; supra note 11. This
discovery has led the researchers to question whether the population that received the
service at a higher rate really benefitted and whether it was necessary or appropriate
for certain individuals in that population to receive the services.
Another group of researchers built upon this work by carefully reviewing the
records of patients who received certain services. They concluded that a substantial
amount of the services, more than 30% in some cases, was unnecessary and should
not have been provided. See Kelly & Kellie, supra note 11, at 1120. These discoveries
have generated a movement to reexamine medical care to better evaluate when it
should be provided. See id.
s1 Defensive medicine practices include more extensive recordkeeping, the
ordering of diagnostic tests and services of questionable necessity, and spending more
time with patients. Perhaps the most prevalent form of defensive medicine is
ordering diagnostic tests when the tests are not clearly indicated by the patient's
symptoms, but where there is a remote chance that the tests might reveal an illness
or injury. The tests are ordered because of fear that if the patient does have a
problem that the test could have detected, the physician would be held liable for not
ordering the test. See Center for Health Policy Research, American Med. Ass'n., The
Cost of Medical Professional Liability in the 1980s, at 2 (1990) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Center For Health Policy Research) [hereinafter Medical
Liability in the 80s]. For methodology and estimates for earlier years, see Roger A.
Reynolds et al., The Cost of Medical Professional Liability, 257 JAMA 2776 (1987).
Insurance facilitates defensive medicine because physicians and courts can be
confident that the care will be paid for.
32 See Medical Liability in the 80s, supra note 31, at 1.
33 See id. at 2.
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services.
3 4
B. Factors External to the Health Care System
35
1. Advances in Medical Technology
A major factor causing increased volume and intensity of health
care services is rapidly advancing medical technology. A contribut-
ing factor to technology advances is the widespread provision of
health plans that provide the money necessary to finance research
and development. Entities that succeed in developing new products
that advance patient care are assured of sales. Providers competing
on the basis of quality are quick to adopt new technology, and they
can be assured of passing on the acquisition costs to insurers and
government plans. As a result, a range of new diagnostic equipment
34 See id.
35 An important factor, one that does not increase volume, is medical inflation.
The prices of most goods and services traded in the U.S. economy have risen during
the past three decades, but prices for medical goods and services have risen faster
than others. As measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), prices for medical care
increased almost 66% more than prices for all consumer items from 1965 to 1989.
During the period 1980-1989, the CPI for medical care increased by 99%, compared
to 46% for shelter, 33% for transportation, and 40% for food. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED REPORT 16 (Dec. 1990).
The factors previously discussed, the effects of health insurance, medical
technology, increased demand caused by an aging population, costs associated with
professional liability, and costs imposed by government regulations, are obvious
causes of medical inflation. But there are other factors as well. Wages in the health
care sector have risen faster than in the rest of the economy. Increases in wages of
rank and file health care workers, those with a college education or less, surpassed
those of employees in the rest of the service sector by 1.3% per year from 1979 to
1985. See Victor R. Fuchs, The Competitive Revolution in Health Care, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1988, at 5, 14. These increases in part reflect an effort by health care
workers to achieve pay levels consistent with persons employed in other industries
(historically rank and file health workers were paid less than employees in other
industries). Ofcourse, these increases were made possible by the increasing demands
for care due to the factors discussed above.
Another reason for medical price inflation is the rate of productivity growth in
health care compared to other industries. Health care is primarily a service industry
characterized by lower productivity growth than manufacturing, a phenomenon
attributed to the labor intensity of service production. During the past century,
manufacturing industries have achieved substantial productivity gains from the
routinization of production and the substitution of capital for labor. Productivity
growth in manufacturing has helped offset wage increases and also tends to keep the
prices of commodities low relative to the price of services. In the health care sector,
productivity growth has been relatively slower, thereby contributing to medical price
inflation above the general rate of inflation. See William J. Baumol, Containing
Medical Costs: Why Price Controls Won't Work, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1988, at 37, 44-45.
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and therapeutic interventions have been rapidly introduced and
widely disseminated in the health sector for several decades. These
new services increase volume because they increase the number of
people who may benefit from therapy. It is also believed, however,
that new medical technologies are often introduced without
adequate evidence that they are beneficial for the range of patients
who use them.
3 6
2. Aging Population
Demographic trends also have increased the volume of health
care services. The proportion of the U.S. population over age sixty-
five has been steadily increasing. Generally, the elderly have greater
health care needs than the young and generate much higher average
health care expenditures.
s7
36 Some of the new products permit therapeutic interventions that were not
possible before the technology was developed. Other innovations improve on existing
diagnostic and medical therapies or reduce the pain or risk of certain invasive
procedures. Certain of these products add to health care costs because they are
expensive, and also because they tend to increase the number of patients who can
benefit from therapy. For example, the cost of AZT, a drug which can delay the
onset of AIDS, is expected to be $5 billion annually. See Peter S. Arno et al., Economic
and Policy Implications of Early Intervention in HIV Disease, 262 JAMA 1493, 1496
(1989). Some advancements, however, such as those which substitute noninvasive
procedures for complicated surgical procedures, can reduce health care costs. See
Victor R. Fuchs, The Health Sector's Share of the Gross National Product, 247 SCIENCE
534,537(1990). Further, the introduction of new drugs may reduce treatment costs
for certain diseases by reducing recovery time. But the general consensus among
economists is that the net effect of advances in technology increases health care
expenditures by increasing the number of patients who may benefit from diagnostic
or treatment products. See Aaron & Schwartz, supra note 21.
37 For example, in 1987 per capita spending on health care was $745 for people
under age 19, compared with $5360 for those ages 65 or over, and $9178 for people
age 85 or over. See SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE, supra note 24, at 42-43. Typically, health
care spending for individuals is highest very late in life. About 30% of the total
Medicare expenditures are incurred by the 6% of enrollees who are in their last year
of life. See James Lubitz & Ronald Prihoda, The Use and Costs of Medicare Services in
the Last 2 Years of Life, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1984, at 117, 117. The effects
of this demographic trend is expected to continue throughout the 1990s and into the
next century. Additionally, the population of the United States is increasing by about
1% per year, which results in a small annual increase in health care expenditures.
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II. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS
AND INCREASING COSTS
As was stated earlier, two types of solutions have been proposed
to resolve the cost problem. The optimistic solution is to eliminate
the inefficiencies caused by internal dysfunctions in the health care
system; the pessimistic solution holds that rationing is inevitable due
to pressures external to the health care system that cannot be
changed and, therefore, the focus should be upon developing
superior forms of rationing.38 The optimistic solution has been
embraced by numerous scholars, policy makers, politicians, and
interest groups, and it has been incorporated into numerous health
system reform proposals.3 9 These proposals aim to expand access
to care and to control costs. Many of these proposals have become
bills that are pending in Congress and various state legislatures.
40
The pessimistic solution can be divided into explicit rationing
and implicit rationing. Given the assumption that there are
insufficient resources to provide all needed health care for all
people, advocates of explicit rationing see the key issue as how to
equitably distribute health care services. They would resolve the
problem of the uninsured and the underinsured by expanding
access, but then applying explicit rationing criteria to determine
what needed health care services would be provided, and the
conditions under which needed services would be withheld. Most
advocates of explicit rationing argue for the development of explicit
rationing criteria through an open and democratic process to assure
adoption of an allocation system that is acceptable to society as a
whole. 41 Explicit rationing has generally not been embraced and
included as part of health system reform proposals. In Oregon,
however, there is a proposal for explicit rationing that would affect
only the impoverished portion of the population.
42
38 See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
39 See supra note 9.
40 See supra note 9. The aggravation of implicit rationing has added force to the
long-standing political movement to provide health care for all U.S. citizens. The
political pressure from those without access to care has increased as their numbers
have risen. In addition, the sense of moral obligation from those with access to care
to provide for those without has been amplified by fear. Those with access are afraid
they could suddenly find themselves uninsured. As a result, reform of the health care
system to assure wide scale coverage of the population has become a potent political
issue. See Noble, supra note 9, at 26-28.
41 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
42 See Letter from Barbara Roberts, Governor of Oregon, to Louis Sullivan, M.D.,
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Most advocates of new forms of implicit rationing believe that
health care costs can best be controlled and brought into balance by
market forces. True to the term of "implicit" rationing, these
proposals are generally not promoted as rationing schemes. One
would give individuals freedom to select different levels of coverage
at different prices. 43 The coverage differentiations would be much
more sophisticated and complex than those of today. Individuals
could select plans that would cover different methods of treating
the same illnesses or injuries-for example, a more or less resource
intensive treatment. While this plan could expand access, it would
allow variations in the quality of care provided.4 4
If the bills pending in Congress are an indication of the political
salability of various reform proposals, then rationing schemes that
apply to all citizens are eventually considered to be politically
infeasible by congressional representatives. Virtually all of the bills
push the optimistic solution. They can be divided into two major
groups, one sponsored primarily by Democrats, the other primarily
by Republicans. Both sets rely heavily on the development of
guidelines to identify and eliminate unnecessary care.
The Democratic proposals would provide a means to finance
health care for virtually all Americans, either through universal
coverage funded by federal and state governments, or by mandating
employers to provide health insurance to all employees and creating
or expanding government programs to cover all other persons.
45
These proposals would control costs by regulating the charges of
health care providers, by setting budgets for total spending, and by
setting budgets for spending on the services of various types of
providers within defined geographic areas.
The budgets would be intended to control volume. Providers
would be responsible for meeting their expenditure budgets for the
patient population served by them. Compliance with budgets would
be facilitated by regulating medical decisionmaking to eliminate
Secretary of Health and Human Services (Aug. 16, 1991) (on file with author)
(includes copy of Oregon's proposal).
43 See Havighurst, supra note 14.
44 Individuals without funds to purchase quality practice parameters will
experience implicit rationing because a person's financial ability directly effects the
quality of care they receive.
45 For a sample of recent Democratic congressional bills aimed to reduce and
eliminate inefficiencies in the health care system, see HEALTH REFORM PROPOSALS,
supra note 9 (summarizing H.R. 3626, H.R. 1300, S. 1446, H.R. 3205, S. 1227, and
H.R. 3410).
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unnecessary health care, by regulating the introduction of new
medical technology to eliminate new services of questionable
benefit, and by reforming the professional liability system to reduce
the costs of malpractice litigation and defensive medicine.
Government agencies would draft practice guidelines for physicians
to use in the clinical management of patients, and they would
monitor physician compliance with them. The guidelines could also
be used in malpractice litigation. The federal Medicare program is
already using some of the procedures that have been proposed by
the Democrats.
The Republican proposals would provide financial assistance to
those persons who could not purchase their own health plans, but
would make them responsible for selecting and making the actual
purchase. The objective is to use market forces to discipline private
payers and" providers, but to avoid the implicit rationing that
normally accompanies market operations by enabling all individuals
to purchase an acceptable health care plan.46 To control costs,
this group would rely upon market forces, assisted by regulations
designed to promote managed care health plans that make efforts
to control provider charges and utilization. In addition, the
professional liability system would be reformed to reduce costs
attributable to defensive medicine and malpractice litigation.
Sponsors of these bills contemplate that private efforts to control
costs would be facilitated by the development of guidelines and
other information that would assist payers and providers in
eliminating unnecessary care. The market techniques that would be
employed by the Republican proposals are already in use in the
private sector.
47
46 See PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, supra note 9, at 1, 17.
47 See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Third Party Payors Of Health Care Services Disclose
Cost Control Mechanisms To Potential Beneficiaries?, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS.J. 115, 121-
30 (1990) (comparing governmental cost-control techniques (prospective payment
systems and diagnostic related groups) to cost-control techniques used by private
health insurance plans). Market techniques attempt to control price levels primarily
by creating competition among providers over prices. This is done by forcing
providers to bid against each other for contracts to provide services to health plan
beneficiaries. Providers who do not win a contract with a health plan will not be
allowed to treat the beneficiaries of that plan. This process may be combined with
techniques designed to make beneficiaries more sensitive to price levels when seeking
health care. Beneficiaries might be required to make a co-payment (a percentage of
the provider's charge) when purchasing services, or incur financial penalties by
selecting a high cost provider when a lower cost provider is available. See KIRK B.
JOHNSON ET AL., AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRACTICE
PARAMETERS 61-66 (1990) [hereinafter LEGAL IMPLICATIONS].
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Given the heavy reliance that both the Democratic and Republi-
can plans place on the identification and elimination of unnecessary
care, an important issue is to define unnecessary care. The issue is
important because the boundary line between needed and unneeded
care is also the border between rationing and the withholding of
unnecessary care.
48
III. THE CONCEPT OF UNNECESSARY CARE
Although the development of guidelines to distinguish necessary
from unnecessary care is essential to the success of both the
Republican and the Democratic reform proposals, the science of
developing guidelines is in its infancy and is not well developed.4 9
Market techniques attempt to control volume by forcing providers to be
responsible about the amount of care that they recommend to patients. One method
involves creating financial incentives for physicians to limit the amount of care that
they provide to beneficiaries. One type of incentive requires physicians to share the
financial risk involved in providing coverage to plan beneficiaries. Risk sharing may
be implemented through arrangements that require a provider to provide all
necessary care to designated beneficiaries for a fixed amount of money, or by
imposing financial penalties for failure to keep the costs of treatment within a budget.
However it is arranged, the provider profits if the amount of care provided to the
beneficiaries costs less than the amount paid.
Another incentive involves prospective and retrospective review of the care
rendered by a provider, with denial of payment for care deemed to be unnecessary.
Prospective review places responsibility on the payer to balance the needs of the
beneficiary with budgetary constraints; a retrospective review places responsibility on
the provider. Yet another method of controlling volume is to develop a practice
profile of a physician to compare with other physicians. A physician who tends to
provide more care than others for the same medical problem would be counseled,
and if he does not respond with lower usage rates, would be barred from treating
beneficiaries of the payer.
The provision of vouchers or tax credits that could be used to purchase health
plans would buttress efforts to create competition among providers by attracting
patients to health plans that do the bestjob at managing provider costs. At present,
employers and other major purchasers of health plans are sensitive to the costs of
purchasing health plan participation, but the individuals that they represent are not
as sensitive and tend to put pressure on employers and others to purchase plans with
features that may make it difficult to control costs.
48 In addition to noting the heavy reliance that the Democratic and Republican
plans place on the development of guidelines to eliminate unnecessary care, it should
be observed that both sets of plans could evolve into implicit rationing schemes if
they are underfunded. The Democratic plans could evolve into queuing and the
Republican plans could result in market based implicit rationing. In addition, they
could also result in rationing if the guidelines used to distinguish necessary from
unnecessary care evolve into rationing devices. That could occur explicitly, or it
could occur implicitly by using the guidelines to narrow the concept of what
constitutes necessary care.
49 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Further, development of the science will not be easy, and presents
certain moral dilemmas. These dilemmas are caused by two factors.
One is the uncertainty inherent in much of medical practice. The
other is differences in the degree of benefit that various services
provide in ameliorating an illness or injury.
For any patient suffering from an illness or injury, there
generally is agreement on what health care services will almost
certainly yield a benefit for a patient, and on what services will
almost definitely not be beneficial. However, there also is a zone of
uncertainty about whether other health care services will benefit the
patient. The uncertainty may result from variations in the gravity
of symptoms suffered by the patient, or questions about the range
of illnesses or injuries for which a medical service is effective, or
other issues. Identification of unnecessary care requires the
assignment of a degree of probability that a service will help a
patient, and a decision about when this probability is high enough
to consider the service necessary. The dilemma is defining the
degree of probability that should be required before the care is
considered necessary.
50
Similarly, for any given patient, certain services may almost
completely cure or resolve an illness or injury, while others provide
only partial relief or do no more than provide some level of comfort
to the patient. The extent to which services will ameliorate a
medical problem or provide comfort may be identifiable with some
degree of certainty. However, the question is what degree of
benefit should be required before a service is considered to be
needed by the patient.
It is plain that the concept of unnecessary care contains an
objective medical science component, which is information about
the probability or extent that a medical service will benefit a patient,
and a normative value judgment component, which is whether the
service is worth providing given the probability or extent that the
patient will benefit from it. Once a conclusion is reached as a
matter of medical science about the benefits of a service for a
patient, then a value judgment can be made about whether it is
5o For an example of a guideline which works through these issues, see
Subcommittee on Pacemaker Implantation, Joint Am. College of Cardiology/Am.
Heart Ass'n Task Force on Assessment of Cardiovascular Procedures, Guidelinesfor
Permanent Cardiac Pacemaker Implantation, May 1984, 4 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 434
(1984). For a discussion of approaches that have been developed to quantify the
likelihood of a benefit, see Chassin, supra note 20, at 443-46.
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necessary. Some of the value judgments are easy to make, others
are more difficult.
5 1
The scientific judgment about the likely benefits of medical
services proposed for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or
injury can hypothetically be ranked on a vertical continuum. At the
top of the continuum are services that definitely will help the
patient or that have the highest probability of doing so. At the
bottom are services that definitely will not help. In between are
services that have some degree of probability of helping the
patient-those higher on the continuum have a higher degree of
probability of helping than those that are lower.
The easy value judgments to make about necessity are for
medical services that are at the top and bottom of the continuum.
Most people would agree that patients should receive services that
definitely will help them, and most people would agree that there
is no reason to provide services that definitely will not help patients.
The harder value judgments are for services in between-those that
may or may not help patients. The question is how far down the
continuum services should be considered necessary.
At present, there is no standard medical terminology for
expressing either the probability or extent that a procedure or
medical service will help a patient, and there is no generally
accepted methodology in medicine for making the value judgment
about whether care is necessary. 52  Traditionally, services have
been provided to patients when there is a low probability that the
services will be beneficial, especially if there are no other services
available with a higher degree of probability of providing a benefit,
the risk of iatrogenic harm is low, and the patient is gravely ill or
insistent upon ameliorating a medical problem. Similarly, services
tend to be provided under the same conditions even when they will
provide a low degree of benefit. It has been considered in the best
interests of the patient to provide care under those circumstances.
The current challenge for physicians is to reexamine the range
51 See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Economic Considerations in Treatment Decisions and the
Standard of Care in MedicalMalpractice Litigation, 264JAMA 2004,2004 (1990) (noting
the tension between patients' interests and "society's need to control health care
expenditures").
512 For analyses of the problems associated with the use of practice guidelines and
their effectiveness in reducing malpractice litigation, see Deborah W. Garnick et al.,
Can Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266JAMA
2856 (1991); Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of Care
in Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886 (1991).
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of medical services and products available and closely evaluate the
extent to which they provide a benefit to patients with an illness or
injury. The object is to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible
about the extent of the benefit provided by a service or product.
Obtaining a better understanding of the benefits realized from care
will place more medical decisions into the "easy" value judgment
category, because physicians will learn more about whether certain
care definitely does or does not confer a substantial benefit to a
patient with a given illness or injury. However, after that is
accomplished, the question will remain about how to make the hard
valuejudgments-where the line is drawn on the degree of probabili-
ty or benefit required before services are considered necessary will
define what constitutes the denial of inappropriate care as opposed
to rationing.
Given that hard value judgments have to be made, the question
arises as to who will ultimately make them, what existing process
will be used to make the value judgments, what standards or
principles will be followed in making the judgments, and whether
those principles should be changed to facilitate the goals of
controlling costs by eliminating unnecessary care. Physicians will
have an important voice in making the value judgments, but courts
will have the decisive role in the absence of legislation. Where the
border between necessary and unnecessary care is set will also
define the difference between the appropriate provision of care and
malpractice, as the failure of a physician to provide or recommend
needed care constitutes malpractice.
Therefore, the standard of care in medical malpractice litigation
will be the vehicle for setting the border unless a legislature imposes
a definition of necessity on the courts. The question is whether the
process and principles by which the standard of care is developed
are adequate to make the value judgments involved, or whether the
process or principles should be changed to facilitate the goal of
eliminating unnecessary care.
IV. How THE STANDARD OF CARE IS DEVELOPED
Currently, the standard of care is the ultimate test for physicians
and payers when evaluating whether care should be provided or
withheld from a patient.53 However, the courts have not done any
" Federal policymakers rely on the tort liability system to prevent abuse from the
incentives imposed on physicians and hospitals by cost control mechanisms in the
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better than physicians in developing clear guidelines about where to
place the boundary between necessary and unnecessary care, or
about how to make the hard value judgments.54 For example,
there is no rule of law which states that medical services are
necessary if there is a ten percent chance that they will help a
patient, and unnecessary if there is a lesser probability.
Medical malpractice litigation begins when a patient who has
suffered an adverse outcome files a lawsuit against a physician
alleging that the bad outcome was caused by the physician's
negligence. In order to recover damages against the physician, the
patient must prove four elements: (a) that the physician owed a
duty of care to the patient, which is proven by showing formation
of a physician-patient relationship, (b) that the physician breached
the duty by failing to exercise reasonable care in providing
treatment, (c) that the patient's injury was proximately caused by the
breach of duty, and (d) that the patient suffered a compensable
injury.
55
A key element in this order of proof is proving that the
physician violated the duty to exercise reasonable care, which is
proven by showing that the physician failed to meet the standard of
care. However, there is no list of standards of care from which a
patient or a court may choose from for use in a particular malprac-
tice case. Instead, the specific standard of care applicable to how
a patient was treated must be proven in each case-it is not legally
predetermined. A preexisting list of standards of care has not been
created for use in malpractice litigation because of the vast diversity
in the characteristics of patients and their problems. It is not
feasible to develop a predetermined standard of care for every
possible clinical problem that a physician might confront.
56
Instead of being drawn from a list, the standard of care
applicable to a physician's conduct in a specific clinical situation is
determined at trial. Each side introduces evidence about how the
standard of care applicable to the case should be defined. The
plaintiff normally calls one or more physicians to testify as an expert
witness about how the defendant physician should have handled the
Medicare System. See Vance-Bryan, supra note 15, at 1421.
54 See Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal Standards GoverningPhysician
Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87,96-99 (discussing malpractice
law standards, characterizing them as "extraordinarilyvague and unpredictable," and
analyzing their shortcomings).
55 See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 18, § 30.
"6 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff patient. The expert witness has the entire field of medicine
available as a basis for testimony. The expert testimony can be
supported or supplemented by articles in medical journals, research
reports, and other sources of information. The defendant physician
normally rebuts by calling physician expert witnesses who testify in
support of how the defendant handled the patient, and by introduc-
ing other evidence.
57
After all of the evidence is introduced, the jury, or a judge
sitting in place of the jury, determines the standard of care
applicable to the case by evaluating the competing evidence
introduced by each party. However, the jury is not without
guidance in evaluating the evidence. The judge issues instructions
to the jury about the law of the case. These instructions create a
framework of rules within which the standard of care is determined.
The rules start the jury with a broad standard of care applicable
to all medical practice. The jury is instructed to compare the
conduct of the defendant physician to what a competent physician
exercising the level of knowledge and skill generally possessed and
exercised by similarly competent physicians would have done under
comparable circumstances. 58 The broad rule is too vague to help
ajury evaluate whether a physician committed malpractice. There-
fore, the rules lead the jury down a path of progressively narrower
standards which are more applicable to the subject matter of the
case until the jury develops the specific standard of care for the
clinical situation at issue.
Narrowing standards may direct, for example, that a specialist's
conduct be compared to other specialists, 59 or that the defendant
be compared to other physicians practicing in the same geographic
locality, 60 or to physicians who subscribe to the same "school of
thought."61 The court may also direct that a physician who elected
to pursue one of the several recognized courses of treatment should
57 See LEGAL IMPLIcATIONs, supra note 47, at 11-13 (reviewing general principles
concerning malpractice trials); Havighurst, supra note 54, at 96-97 (discussing how the
process of a malpractice trial determines the standard of care).
58 See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical
Specialist as Determined by Loca4 "Like Community," State, National or Other Standards,
18 A.L.R. 4TH 603, 614-20 (1982).
59 See id. at 616-19.
60 See id. at 608-11.
61 See, e.g., Becker v. Hidalgo, 556 P.2d 35, 38 (N.M. 1976) (considering and
rejecting testimony of expert physician regarding proper means of performing
procedure where the expert subscribed to a different school of thought than the
defendant).
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not be penalized, so long as the course selected is accepted by at
least a "respectable minority" of the profession. 62 Further narrow-
ings are a matter of competing evidence to be decided by the jury.
In summary, the development of the standard of care is a highly
particularized process whereby a set of general principles is applied
to develop a standard of care tailored to the unique circumstances
of a case. The process is flexible and capable of evolution as
medicine evolves and advances. For example, as the profession's
technological capability has increased, the standard of care has
evolved with it and become more stringent.63 An important
question is how the value judgments inherent in the development
of the standard of care might evolve in response to a societal
interest in controlling health care costs.
A. How the Value Judgment is Made
Development of the standard of care is heavily dependent on the
customary and usual practice of the medical profession. 64  A
medical malpractice trial often involves a contest to determine what
was considered to be good medical practice when the patient
involved was treated. The contest is decided by evaluating the
testimony and writings of physicians. Some have argued that the
dependence on physician custom allows the profession to set its own
legal standards of conduct.65 If that argument were correct, then
physicians would be making the value judgments that are inherent
in the standard of care, but that is not the case.
When the issue in malpractice litigation concerns whether
necessary medical services were withheld from a patient, or whether
substandard services were delivered because of financial incentives
62 See, e.g., Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding
"[w]here two or more schools of thought exist ... each of which is supported by
responsible medical authority, it is not malpractice to be among the minority in a
given city who follow one of the accepted schools").
63 See Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND.
L.J. 528, 538-57 (1976).
64 SeeJoseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:
The "Accepted Practice"Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213,1236-41 (1975); Pearson, supra
note 63, at 528; Neil Meltzer, Comment, Helling v. Carey: Landmark or Exception in
Medical Malpractice; Compliance with the Medical Standard of Care May Not Protect the
Specialist from Liability, 11 NEw ENG. L. REV. 301, 301-02 (1975); see also Havighurst,
supra note 54, at 96-98 (discussing the "customary-practice" standard).
65 See King, supra note 64, at 1236; Meltzer, supra note 64, at 302; see also PROSSER
ON TORTS, supra note 18, § 32, at 185-93 (discussing professional malpractice in
relation to concepts of superior knowledge, skill and intelligence).
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to minimize the resources expended on a patient, the standard of
care consists of the objective medical science component and the
normative value judgment discussed earlier in this Commentary.
66
The objective medical science component is almost always deter-
mined by the medical profession, although sometimes scientists
from other disciplines may assist. There are practical reasons why.
It takes an extensive education and years of experience to become
competent at the art and science of medicine. Due to human
limitations, it is not feasible for nonphysician judges and juries to
second guess physicians about the likely benefits that services would
have had for a patient. Courts are often required to choose
between conflicting evidence about what the standard of care should
be. However, when that occurs, they are choosing between the
opinions of physicians. Further, their ability to choose is restricted
by rules such as the "school of thought" or "respectable minority"
rules, which require courts to accept differing medical opinions
provided that they are each subscribed to by substantial numbers of
authoritative physicians.
The value judgment component is made in light of conclusions
reached about the likely benefits that services would have had for
the plaintiff patient. It involves an evaluation as to whether the
services should have been provided given their likely benefits, the
risk of iatrogenic harm, and the gravity of the problem experienced
by the patient. Normally the value judgment does not involve an
explicit consideration of the costs of caring for a patient, although
economics are implicitly considered. Physicians do not do every-
thing conceivably possible in caring for a patient-they draw what
they consider to be reasonable boundary lines. For example,
physicians do not order every diagnostic test available for a patient
that requests a physical examination, even though doing so might
reveal interesting information. Instead, they order tests which are
indicated given the age and physical characteristics of the patient.
Physicians make the initial value judgment about what care is
reasonable to provide to a patient, although on many occasions they
leave the decision up to their patients. However, the usual and
customary practices of the profession are not decisive in determin-
ing this component. Courts feel that they can make the normative
value judgment as well as physicians. Courts, together with
legislatures, act as the vehicle of societal expression about the values
66 See supra text accompanying note 51.
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which should guide the decision about whether likely benefits are
significant enough to provide services, and the amount of resources
that should be expanded on an individual. Courts can exercise this
authority by overruling the value judgment made by the physician
involved in the malpractice case.
An example of a court overruling the value judgment of
physicians and imposing its own is the famous case of Helling v.
Carey.67 In Helling, the issue was whether an ophthalmologist
should have tested a twenty-nine-year-old patient for glaucoma
during an eye examination. The patient involved had glaucoma, but
was not diagnosed before the symptoms became noticeable because
the test was not performed.68 At that time (early 1970s), the
prevailing practice among ophthalmologists was not to test a twenty-
nine-year-old patient because the incidence of glaucoma in people
that young was very low.69 It was not considered worthwhile to
test young people. However, the court disagreed, and found that
the prevailing practice was inadequate and that the patient should
have been tested.7 °
The Helling court did not disagree with the medical science
conclusion of ophthalmologists that the incidence of glaucoma in
young people was very low. It did not find that physicians were
wrong, and that the incidence of the disease was in fact higher.
Instead, the court disagreed with the value judgment made by
ophthalmologists that testing for glaucoma in young people was not
worthwhile, even though the incidence of the disease was very low
in that population.
As a practical matter, it is rare for a court to expressly overrule
the value judgments that prevail among physicians. That is probably
because physicians, judges, and juries are all part of American
culture, and have the same societal values. Those shared values
include a bias towards providing whatever care might help a sick or
injured patient.71 Therefore, courts have rarely had to express the
value judgment component and it has not been an integral issue in
most malpractice cases. Courts have concentrated on developing
67 519 P.2d. 981 (Wash. 1974) (en banc). The holding of Helling was reaffirmed
in Gates v. Jensen, 595 P.2d 919 (Wash. 1979).
68 See Helling, 519 P.2d at 981-82.
69 See id. at 982-83 (noting that glaucoma occurs in only one out of every 25,000
people under age forty).
70 See id. at 983.
71 Cf Enthoven,supra note 10, at 1230 ("Physicians and other health professionals
are motivated by nonfinancial goals, including a desire to cure the sick .... ").
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and applying the scientific component.
Although the courts have the authority to make the value
judgment involved in determining whether care should have been
provided to a patient, their discretion is not unlimited. The value
judgment has to be made within a framework formed by the general
principles that are applied in developing the standard of care. In
malpractice cases, the context in which the standard of care has
been developed is the physician-patient relationship. The issue is
what obligation the physician had towards the patient who brought
suit, and whether the obligation was discharged.
B. The Limits Imposed on the Judicial Value Judgment by the
Patient-Interest Oriented Standard of Care
While malpractice is a tort claim, the physician-patient relation-
ship is contractual in nature. The contract is created when the
physician accepts the request of an individual to become a patient.
In fact, malpractice claims were originally brought as actions for
breach of contract, and they still can be brought as contract cases.
The tort remedy evolved from the breach of contract claim, and the
duty involved in tort standard of care is based on a voluntarily
assumed contractual obligation.
72
The contractual obligation upon which the tort duty is implied
is inherent in the physician-patient relationship. It is not necessary
for the physician to expressly agree to every aspect of the obligation
in order for it to be part of the contract between physician and
patient.73 The implied contractual obligation probably evolved
from physician ethics. Physicians held themselves out to the public
as adhering to a code of ethics designed to protect patients, a
particularly important consideration given the vulnerable position
patients are in when they are sick or injured.74 Eventually the
public came to expect that physicians would adhere to key portions
of that code when treating a patient, and the courts converted those
expectations into an implied contract, and then a tort duty.
72 See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 18, § 30, at 164 (noting that "duty" is an
essential element of any tort claim).
73 See THEODORE R. LEBLANG ET AL., THE LAW OF MEDICAL PRACTICE IN ILLINOIS
§ 4.2 (1986).
74 For a presentation of the physician's evolution into the role of an implied
fiduciary, see MORRIS FISHBEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
1847 TO 1947, at 35-40 (1947); PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 10-57 (Chauncey D.
Leake ed., 1927).
1838 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1809
Under the implied contractual provision and the tort duty, the
physician is, in essence, a fiduciary for the patient.75 As is the case
with other types of fiduciaries, the physician has an obligation to
place the patient's interests above almost all other considerations,
especially the physician's own interests. 76 The main part of this
obligation is the requirement that the physician exercise due care
and skill in the treatment of the patient.77 As part of that obliga-
tion, the physician has a duty to provide or recommend the care
that is needed by a patient, and to administer the care competently.
The courts are the interpreters of the degree of skill that a physician
is expected to have and to exercise when caring for a patient.
Determining the standard of care in a malpractice case is an
exercise in evaluating the level of skill that should have been applied
by the physician in the circumstances of the case.
However, the fiduciary relationship that exists between a
physician and patient goes further than requiring that a physician
exercise an acceptable level of skill and care during the treatment
of a patient. It is inherent in a fiduciary relationship that the
fiduciary act in the best interests of the person who has entrusted
the fiduciary. 78 Therefore, a physician has an independent obliga-
tion to act in the best interests of the patient beyond the require-
ment that the physician exercise skill; merely acting as a good
technician is insufficient. This obligation is probably a greater
restraint on the withholding of needed services by a physician than
is the requirement that the physician exercise an adequate level of
skill. It prevents the physician from paying excessive attention to
the societal interest in conserving resources when caring for a
patient.
75 See PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, AND OTHERS, supra note 18, §§ 166-168. But not
all agree that it is clear that a physician is, or should be, a strict fiduciary for the
patient. For a discussion of this perspective, see Mehlman, supra note 14, at 367-70
(describing how the physician-patient relationship does and does not resemble
traditional fiduciary relationships); E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure and
Economic Advocacy: New Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12J. LEGAL MED. 275,
296-301 (1991) (setting forth the argument for a more contractual model).
76 See PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, AND OTHERS, supra note 18, §§ 166-168 (detailing
physician's duties as a fiduciary); Morreim, supra note 75, at 300 (noting that
physicians must hold to a "professional altruism that places the patient's interests
above his or her own"); see also FISHBEIN, supra note 74, at 39-40 (stating that
physicians must "labor[] for the alleviation of... suffering without regard to the risk
of his own health or life or to financial return").
77 See PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, AND OTHERS, supra note 18, § 167.
78 See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 18, at 34-35 op. 8.03; Morriem, supra
note 75, at 300; supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, with respect to making value judgments about what
care is needed, the courts are limited by their role in interpreting
the level of skill that should have been applied by a physician and
the physician's fiduciary obligation to the patient. There is some
room in this role for evolution of the value judgments away from
requiring that care be provided when there is doubt about its
ultimate value, and towards requiring that there be a higher
probability of known benefits before the care is considered to be
necessary. However, there is no room in that role for withholding
care which is known to be, or has a reasonable probability of being
beneficial. That would be a stark and unacceptable departure from
the requirement that the physician exercise a certain level of skill
and care in the treatment of patients and act in their best inter-
est.
79
V. THE STANDARD OF CARE AND IMPLICIT OR EXPLICIT RATIONING
Although the standard of care is patient-interest oriented, the
standard does not prevent all forms of rationing. For example, it
does not bar the kind of market based implicit rationing that exists
in the United States today. The reason why is the contractual
nature of the relationship between patient and physician. The
standard of care does not apply until the physician-patient relation-
ship has been formed, and the relationship is not formed unless it
is voluntarily assumed by the physician.8 0 The law does not
require physicians to treat any patient that asks for care.81 The
law does require that a patient-interest standard of care be followed
79 Willful provision of inadequate treatment clearly violates the standard of care
and is unethical as well. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 18, at 20 op. 4.04.8 0 See 2 MICHAEL G. MACDONALD, TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW § 11.03[1][c]
(1991) ("[T]he obligation of physicians to accept or treat specific patients... remains
one of mutual contract largely unregulated by state or federal laws."); PROSSER ON
TORTS, supra note 18, § 32, at 186-87 (noting that a physician's duty to a patient
commences only once she "undertak[es] to render medical services").
81 See 2 MACDONALD, supra note 80, § 11.03[2][c][i]. There are some limitations
on this proposition, such as requirements that physicians not discriminate. See, e.g.,
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102, 104 Stat. 327,
331 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (West Pamphlet 1992)) (requiring physicians not
to discriminate against AIDS patients or others). Although public hospitals and
government health care programs have an obligation to treat all patients with certain
characteristics, see 2 MACDONALD, supra note 80, § 11.03[1][a][i], private hospitals are
generally not required to admit every patient that wants care, see id. § 11.0312][b][i].
In addition, private insurers are generally free to set limits on whom they will cover
and have no obligation to finance the care of a beneficiary beyond the agreed terms
of coverage contained in the health plan contract. See id. § 11.03[2][iii].
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once the physician agrees to care for a patient.8 2 This legal
standard is also consistent with physician ethics. The ethical
physician provides charitable care, but Principle VI of the AMA
Principles of Ethics states that a physician shall "be free to choose
whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in
which to provide medical services." 3 Therefore, a physician is not
required to care for any specific patient in meeting an ethical
obligation to provide charitable care.
Further, a physician is not obligated to care for a patient
indefinitely or even as long as the patient needs care for an illness
or injury. A physician may sever a relationship with a patient as a
matter of law and ethics. To withdraw from a relationship, the
physician must give the patient sufficient notice for the patient to
find a new physician, and must continue caring for the patient
during the notice period. 4 However, the physician does not have
to care for the patient after the notice period is over if the patient
has not been able to find another physician.8 5 Therefore, a
physician can withdraw from a physician patient-relationship if a
patient runs out of financial resources and can no longer afford to
pay for care. If a physician recommends that a patient receive
certain services, but the patient runs out of insurance coverage or
the insurer refuses to finance the services recommended, the
physician may withdraw from the relationship.
In addition, a physician is not obligated to provide a patient
with the services of other providers, such as hospitals, other types
of health facilities, other physicians, or other health care profession-
als, if those providers will not accept the patient.8 6 A physician
may be willing to provide charitable care to an uninsured patient,
but cannot force other providers to do the same. Physicians also
cannot force hospitals or other providers to continue caring for a
patient if the patient runs out of resources during a hospital stay or
during the course of a treatment, and they cannot force payers to
continue financing the care of a patient after the cost of a patient's
care has gone beyond the limits of coverage in a health plan.
Further, the patient-interest oriented standard of care is not
82 See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 18, § 32, at 186-87; supra note 18.
83 CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 18, at x.
84 See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 18, at 39 op. 8.11; PHYSICIANS,
SURGEONS, AND OTHERS, supra note 18, §§ 234-238.
85 See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 18, at 39 op. 8.11.
86 An exception to this is when a physician group has a contractual obligation to
provide care pursuant to an HMO or other contract.
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incompatible with all forms of explicit rationing. In fact, it would
be possible to implement many kinds of explicit rationing schemes
under current legal and ethical standards. All that is necessary is to
structure explicit rationing so that it does not collide with the
physician's obligation under the patient-interest oriented standard
of care. For purposes of analyzing how explicit rationing could be
implemented without conflicting with the patient-interest standard
of care, it is helpful to divide the standard into two components.
One component is the duty to determine what care is necessary and
recommend to the patient that it be provided; the other is the duty
to exercise due care in the provision of treatment. As previously
discussed, there generally is no duty to provide the care recom-
mended unless the physician has voluntarily agreed to provide the
services. The critical aspect in how rationing schemes interact with
the patient-interest oriented standard of care is how they influence
the physician's recommendations for what care should be provided.
If the predetermined criteria for explicit rationing are applied
to a patient before being seen by a physician, then the patient-
interest oriented standard of care would not apply at all. This could
be accomplished with schemes that ration care according to age or
other nonmedical criteria. If a physician sees a patient and
recommends that certain care be provided, but the explicit rationing
scheme bars the funding of the type of care recommended, or
actually bars the patient from receiving the care, the physician
would have no obligation to provide the services and the patient-
interest oriented standard of care would not apply. Similarly, if a
physician recommended that a certain type of care be provided, but
an explicit rationing scheme allocated a fixed amount of funds to
the patient that was insufficient to pay for the care, the physician
would not have an obligation to provide the services and the
standard of care would not be violated.
The area in which rationing collides with the standard of care is
where it affects the recommendations for care made by the
physician. For example, if physicians are given guidelines that
recommend care which may not satisfy the patient-interest standard
of care,8 7 and less than optimal recommendations are in fact
made, the physicians could be liable for any injuries to patients
attributable to the recommendations.8 8 At present then, the
87 Widespread denials of needed care made as a result of such arrangements
would clearly constitute a form of rationing.
88 See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 18, § 32, at 185-89; supra note 18.
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patient-interest oriented standard of care prevents physicians from
making recommendations that result in denials of needed care to
patients.8 9
VI. WHETHER THE PATIENT-INTEREST ORIENTED STANDARD OF
CARE SHOULD BE CHANGED
Some commentators have suggested that the standard of care be
changed to allow physicians greater leeway in recommending that
care not be provided to a patient.90 These commentators recog-
nize that there is a limit to how much the standard of care can
evolve to accommodate a societal interest in conserving costs when
physicians make recommendations to patients about what care is
needed to diagnose or treat an illness or injury. They believe that
the standard of care should account for a more substantial societal
interest in conserving costs than may be feasible under the current
patient-interest oriented standard.
91
The standard of care could be changed by legislation or through
evolution in the courts. One method of change would be to alter
the broad principles that underlie the standard to make them less
patient-interest oriented. For example, legislation could impose a
rule which provided that care would not be deemed necessary
unless it had a high probability of resulting in a substantial benefit
to the patient.
92
A more likely method of change involves the development of
guidelines designed to distinguish between necessary and unneeded
care. Governments could draft guidelines that physicians would be
allowed or required to use and which courts would be required to
apply as standards of care.93  The guidelines would specify the
89 See Hirshfeld, supra note 47, at 117, 135-38.
90 See supra note 15.
91 See Morreim, Cost Containment, supra note 15, at 1745-63 (reviewing strategies
to change the law so that it accommodates "cost constraints" and concluding that the
best option is to change the "standard of care" into a "rebuttable presumption");
Morreim, Scarcity, supra note 15, at 359-63 (proposing a new standard of care
composed of two elements, one being a "Standard of Resource Use").
92 Another way would be to inject a cost consideration into the standard, and have
physicians balance a duty to society to control costs against their duty to the patient.
A third way would be to provide a defense for physicians who treat patients without
access to sufficient financing for health care. See Morreim, Cost Containment, supra
note 15, at 1757-63. The defense would allow physicians to demonstrate that they
recommended or provided the best care feasible for a patient given the financial
resources available. See id.
s For discussions about government-imposed guidelines as the standard of care,
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patient management strategies required for patients with certain
medical problems. Drafters of the guidelines would balance the
need to conserve costs against the needs of individual patients when
considering what patient care strategies to include for the treatment
of various medical problems. The guidelines could set the boundary
between necessary and unneeded care at a different point than
would a court applying the patient-interest oriented standard of
care. The guidelines could allow or require that the cheaper of two
alternatives be used to treat a patient even though the more
expensive methods might be more effective or less likely to cause
iatrogenic injury.
This approach is likely because guidelines designed to distin-
guish between necessary and unnecessary care are in fact under
development by governments and many private organizations.
94
In fact, one state, Maine, has implemented a demonstration project
whereby state approved practice guidelines may be used by
physicians in caring for patients, and adherence to an approved
practice guideline may be used as a defense in a malpractice
action.95 It is easy to see how the need to control costs could
cause governments to adopt guidelines that are weighted towards
the societal interest in conserving resources. The lack of a clear
methodology to use in making the hard value judgments could
see Havighurst, supra note 54, at 105-07. For a discussion of other ways that
guidelines could impact the standard of care, see Troyen A. Brennan, Practice
Guidelines and Malpractice Litigation: Collision or Cohesion?, 16J. HEALTH POL POL'Y
& L. 67 (1991); Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in
Malpractice Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 119, 129-45;
Havighurst, supra note 14, at 816-19; Eleanor Kinney, Medical Practice Guidelines and
Medical Liability: Evolutionary Trends and Future Implications (unpublished article
on file with the author, forthcomingin a RAND publication, 1992); Richard E. Leahy,
Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to
Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483, 1495-1505 (1989).
"' In 1989, Congress created the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
(AHCPR) and a unit of AHCPR called The Forum for Quality and Effectiveness in
Health Care to pursue the development of practice guidelines, among other matters.
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6103, 103
Stat. 2106, 2189 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299, 299b-1 to -3 (Supp. 11989)). For a
summary of efforts to create guidelines by physician organizations, see Kelly &
Swartwout, supra note 20, at 54-57. For a summary of such efforts by others, see
Kinney, supra, note 93, at 6-8.
95 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-2978 (West Supp. 1991); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c) (1988) (limiting liability of physicians who reasonably rely on a
professionally developed norm of care and treatment applied by a peer review
organization under contract with the United States Department of Health and Human
Services).
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facilitate such weighing because it might not be immediately clear
that it was occurring. A shift towards the societal interest would be
even harder to notice if it occurred slowly over time, so that a
substantial shift was not detectible in the drafting of any particular
guideline.
Of all the alternatives suggested to facilitate the volume and
intensity of care, this approach seems to be the least desirable for
a number of reasons. First, changing the standard of care by
placing a greater weight on economic considerations at the expense
of the patient's interests would dramatically alter the fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship. The physician would
be given a duty or permission to consider matters that were not
necessarily in the patient's interest when evaluating a course of
treatment, and might even be required or allowed to recommend a
course of care that was not optimal. The patient would no longer
be able to have confidence that the physician was oriented around
the patient's best interests. The fiduciary element of the physician-
patient relationship has long been embraced by society as valuable
and desirable. Given that sick or injured patients are often in a
vulnerable state, and given that they do not have the medical knowl-
edge necessary to evaluate their own problems, society has consid-
ered it important that patients be able to place trust and confidence
in physicians. This relationship is one that should not be modified
or given up without deep consideration, for if we give it up we will
have lost something that is beyond monetary value.
Second, changing the standard of care to accommodate a
societal interest in conserving costs would be more difficult than it
first appears. If the standard is changed to require a balancing of
societal interests in conserving costs against the needs of the
patient, the question will become how to accomplish that balancing
in a consistent and equitable manner. Each medical situation is
unique, and it will be difficult to decide, on a case by case basis,
when it is appropriate to deny care that could benefit the patient.
Third, if rationing becomes necessary, there are ways that it can
be accomplished without changing the standard of care. As has
already been discussed, the patient-interest oriented standard of
care can accommodate explicit rationing. Criteria for explicit
rationing can be developed pursuant to an open and democratic
process, and then observed by physicians and patients. That would
leave physicians free to evaluate a patient and make recommenda-
tions based on what the physician believes to be in the patient's best
interests, and then the rationing criteria could be applied to
1992] ETHICAL AND LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PHYSICIANS 1845
determine whether the care recommended could be provided.
One might argue that there is no ultimate difference between
changing the standard of care to incorporate rationing criteria and
applying rationing criteria to the recommendations of a physician.
Given that guidelines are being developed for use by physicians and
courts to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary care, it
would be practical and logical to simply build the rationing criteria
into the guidelines. That may even be more efficient, because it
would eliminate the step of applying rationing criteria to the
recommendations of a physician. The criteria could simply be
applied by the physician at the time of treatment, and applied by a
court as the standard of care in the event of a malpractice case.
However, use of guidelines to be applied by physicians in the
implementation of rationing would have the adverse effects already
mentioned. In addition, it would tend to legitimize rationing
decisions as medically valid, since they would be applied by
physicians who historically have been the fiduciaries of patients. As
the use of guidelines increased, it would become increasingly
difficult to distinguish between the medical decisions of physicians
that are based on rationing and those that were based on the needs
of the patient.96 It would not only be difficult for lay persons to
tell the difference; but after a time, the use of economic consider-
ations would become so ingrained in medical practice that physi-
cians themselves would start to lose sight of the distinction. If this
occurred, valuable information about the potential of medical
practice would be lost. The detrimental impact of rationing would
become much less vivid, and the need to find ways to eliminate
rationing would appear deceptively less urgent.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the patient-interest oriented standard of care
applicable in medical malpractice litigation should not be changed
to accommodate new models of rationing. Instead, the patient's
interest should continue to be the focus of the standard, and should
96 See Hall, supra note 15, at 349 (summarizing the English experience in
allocating scarce health care resources in which physicians "through a process of
euphemization, justified treatment restrictions as an exercise of sound medical
judgment").
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serve as the foundation principle upon which guidelines to
distinguish between necessary and unneeded care are built.97 We
should focus our efforts on how to develop a methodology oriented
around the patient's interest for drafters of guidelines to use when
confronted with the hard value judgments that will need to be made
in the drafting process. If rationing becomes necessary, so be it; but
the criteria should be explicit and their development and applica-
tion should not alter the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient
relationship. The process of developing rationing criteria should be
separate from the process of determining what is appropriate for
the patient in light of the patient's best interests.
97 See AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES PROCEEDINGS: 140TH ANNUAL
MEETING 121, 136 (1991).
